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Beyond Peak Oil: Will Our Cities and Regions Collapse?

by Peter Newman

Amidst public debate on climate change and resource degradation, there has been comparatively little discussion of peak oil and the grave threats it poses. Professor Peter Newman explains peak oil and suggests what we can do about it.

The peak oil crisis

Every oil field goes through a production cycle of increase-peak-decline. While half of an oil well remains at the peak in its production, the other half of the oil is harder to extract, it becomes more and more filled with water and requires more and more energy to pump it out. Eventually the well is abandoned. Regions of oil and national supplies can be examined to see how they appear in this cycle of oil depletion. After an area or nation peaks in its oil then a very different set of economic and political factors come into play as it must look elsewhere for its oil if it is to continue growing in its use. When in 1956 M. King Hubbert first suggested that the US would peak in oil production in 1970 he was greeted with derision. However it happened and the US began to import oil which led to the formation of OPEC and the geopolitics of oil in the last part of the 20th century. The US now imports half of its oil and it cost them US$144 billion for the first ten months of 2005. This was an increase of 32% over the previous year because the cost of a barrel of oil is spiralling, perhaps, some say, because the world oil production peak is occurring.

Global discoveries of oil peaked in the 1960s. Enormous effort has gone into trying to discover more and to extract more from the reserves that remain. Oil reserves are now growing at a much slower rate than oil is being consumed. A peak in global oil production is therefore inevitable. There are various estimates of when the peak will occur but they cluster around the early part of this century, with a few (now mostly discredited) way out into the future. C.J. Campbell, an oil geophysicist who founded the Association for the Study of Peak Oil, says that conventional oil peaked in 2004 and all oil liquids will peak in 2010. He says:

> *The real point is not so much the exact date of peak but the statement that the First Half of the Oil Age, which was characterised by growing production, is about to be followed by the Second Half when oil production is set to decline along with all that depends upon it. On that at least we can stand firm.*

The ABC *Catalyst* television show on peak oil in November 2005 reported an Australian oil company CEO who had asked the attendees at last year's Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association whether they thought the global oil production peak had already occurred—half had raised their hands.

Oil companies tend to give statistics on oil availability based on how long it will last at present rates of consumption. This tends to be around 30 to 40 years, but this is misleading as oil will not keep being produced at



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THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

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the same rate then suddenly stop. The second half of the production cycle is harder so there is physically less and less available each year once the peak is passed. In an economy used to increases each year this is a significant difference. The peak is the critical change point.

Despite attempts by OPEC in recent times to increase production, global oil seems to be at its full capacity. This level may hold for a few years then it will inevitably fall. This is happening just as China and India have entered the global oil market in a big way—China is now the world's second biggest consumer of oil. Supply to consumers in the West will be constrained by physical capacity and by the new players in the global market. The reality is the Golden Age of oil is over.

Why has there been a rush of awareness and concern around this issue? A number of geophysicists and industry insiders have 'blown the whistle' with their misgivings, especially on how real the oil reserves actually are. Most oil reserves are in the hands of OPEC but these analysts were concerned about the reality of some Middle Eastern reserves (especially Saudi Arabia); they were able to demonstrate that 'phantom reserves' had been created in the past decades in order to create higher OPEC quotas on production. Quotas on production were a license to make money in a world desperate for oil. Re-evaluating the known geophysical data by people like Campbell shows we are close to the peak, if not already there, and that oil will soon be subject to major physical shortages.

My involvement in this issue goes back to the first oil crisis in 1973 when I was a post-doctoral student at Stanford University in California. The OPEC-induced physical reductions in supply caused real panic in the community as people stayed at home or queued for hours for diminishing supplies. M. King Hubbert, by then over 80, gloated to a rapidly convened energy course at Stanford that he had predicted this crisis in 1956. However, he said, though the crisis in 1973 seemed hard the real test would be in the early part of the 21st century when global oil would peak. This would be, he believed, the biggest challenge our oil-based civilization had ever faced.

The response from most economists is that supply and demand will create the necessary change; 'the stone age didn't end with a shortage of stones' is a statement frequently heard when oil depletion is debated. BP Exploration Manager Richard Miller, in response to this statement, said that:

> *This is the classical economist's view: something will turn up, when the price of oil is high enough, because something always does. But there isn't anything conceivable that could replace conventional oil, in the same quantities or energy densities, at any meaningful price. We can't mine the oil sands in sufficient quantity because there isn't enough water to process them. We can't grow bio-fuels because there would be no land left to grow food. Solar, hydro, wind, and geothermal don't yield enough energy, hydrogen (from water) takes more energy to make than it can yield, and nuclear fission and fusion are presently off most political agendas... When oil gets too expensive, surviving Americans will still obtain energy from alternative sources, but in much smaller amounts and at much higher prices.*

There are many conferences on this topic now, especially by the Association for Peak Oil. A key presenter at their International Oil Depletion Workshop in 2002 was Matthew Simmons, a prominent energy-sector investment banker from Houston and author of *Twilight in the Desert* which shows that Saudi Arabia's reserves are not what the world had been relying on. Simmons said:

> *I have studied the depletion issue intensely for too long now to have any remaining doubts as to the severity of the issue. But I am still amazed at the limited knowledge that exists, even in the U.S. or within our major oil and gas company's senior management about this topic and its dire consequences.*
>
> *Most serious scientists worry that the world oil supplies will peak [and then decline]. Peaking of oil cannot be predicted accurately, but the event will occur. Peaking turns out to only be clear through a 'rear-view mirror'. By then, an alternative or solution is too late. My analysis leads me to worry that peaking is at hand, not years away. If I am right, the unforeseen consequences are devastating. The facts are too serious to ignore.*

Australian cities … have not intervened in any radical way to stop oil-consuming behaviours

A 2005 report prepared for the US Department of Energy by Hirsch et al. confirmed such warnings. Entitled *The Mitigation of the Peaking of World Oil Production*, the report observed:

> *… the world has never faced a problem like this. Without massive mitigation more than a decade before the fact, the problem will be pervasive and will not be temporary. Previous energy transitions were gradual and evolutionary. Oil peaking will be abrupt and revolutionary.*

I have spent the past thirty years trying to create awareness on this issue and to help prepare our cities and regions for the new constraint. When the ABC *Catalyst* show dramatised the issue recently it was the first time I had seen such a media story in Australia apart from a few

newspaper articles in Perth (many of my colleagues in other Australian cities say they have never been able to get into Sydney or Melbourne papers). In response to the show I received a number of emails including one from a man who said that he was amazed that as an educated person he had never been exposed to this issue. He assumed it was a 'beat up' so followed it through on the web and found a plethora of material that convinced him we were correct.

Although there is growing awareness of the problem, there is also widespread ignorance and denial, even by people who should know better. Why? Obviously oil companies don't want to talk up looming shortages due to the impact on their share price, though 23% of Shell's reserves were found to be 'phantom reserves' which led to the resignation of their CEO and some real share price issues. Governments can take their share of responsibility for not wanting to jump into this issue as well; it is not in their interest to disturb people. But most of all, the community at large, I feel, is not willing to think about the implications.

City growth and regional productivity

Cities have grown strongly in the age of cheap oil. Cities are presently growing globally at 2.3% per year and rural areas at 0.1% which means people are still leaving the country for the city. Today around half of humanity live in cities. All Australian cities participate in a global economy which has been built around the availability of cheap oil.

There are no models we can easily use to understand how cities will manage in the age of reduced oil availability. All Australian cities have recently had strategic planning studies done for the next 30 years of development. Although the studies have recognised that there is a need to reduce automobile dependence and save on oil, they have not intervened in any radical way to stop oil-consuming behaviours, and they have assumed continuing growth in population and jobs—growth which peak oil could throw into doubt. What will happen to Australian cities as oil peaks?

In Australian regional areas also, the population has been declining but not regional economic productivity based on mining and agriculture. Both activities have been growing based on cheap oil. Both have a large component of diesel for transport, machinery and processing. What will happen to regional productivity in the age of declining oil availability?

Collapse

Many forecasts of the consequences are taking on an increasingly apocalyptic tinge. The work of Jared Diamond on how civilizations in the past have collapsed is often related to this issue. A Republican Senator after discovering peak oil said 'civilization as we know it will end soon'. Some people believe that our cities will not only 'collapse' but will be dispersed and we will then create a more sustainable semi-rural lifestyle where we will all be responsible for a large proportion of our own food. This is seen to be in suburban agriculture, permaculture villages or hobby farms. Fundamental to this scenario is population decline as a quick calculation shows that the available land to enable small scale production would quickly disappear if all of our cities were pushed out onto agricultural land. The population in this scenario is reduced to one or two million in Australia and one or two billion in the world. The transition is never described but it would seem that *The Killing Fields* would be a playground by comparison. It is however often discussed with some relish as the anti-population, anti-urban movements often link together to imagine a ruralised city as the preferred future. Peak oil is thus sometimes grabbed hold of with glee. Such ideas need to be assessed as their currency grows daily under the frightening scenarios of peak oil.

… we are not likely to reverse 13,000 years of urban history

The broad sweep of history shows that although cities have collapsed as they depleted their soils or were unable to manage their settlements or were destroyed by invaders, they have not gone back to a rural Eden: cities tend to be rebuilt, and have endured and grown.

The reason we rebuild and adapt cities is that our choices for returning to nature are very limited and to most people, are not acceptable. Not only do we not want to become totally dependent on foraging or hunting for our food, we mostly do not want the responsibility for food production at all. The attractions of doing other things that are only possible if we are freed from food production, drives us to cities.

We are going to have come to terms with a new kind of agriculture and a new kind of city, but we are not likely to reverse 13,000 years of urban history. Nor would we want to as the consequences for rural production as occurred in the forced ruralisation programs of Mao and Pol Pot were disastrous.

Cities are our likely habitat for the foreseeable future. We need to constantly adapt to ensure they are more sustainable: in their resources, in their ecological base and in their human livability. They can collapse if we don't adapt. In the same way rural production will still need to be the source of food, minerals and materials. Such activity however will need to adjust to being done without oil, or it also will collapse. The core argument of Jared Diamond is not that there are physical limits which

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exist but that our ability to adapt to these is the real test of our civilization.

So what should we do?

1. Take it seriously—education, crash demonstrations, research.

Awareness of this issue needs to go through a similar process to the one that the world has adopted over climate change. Although Australia is seen as something of a laggard over climate change, a conservative administration did set up the Australian Greenhouse Office with several hundred staff, a budget for demonstrations, research and a serious commitment to educating the public. Global conferences of nations need to be established through the UN or other groupings like APEC, in order to set goals and begin sharing information on how the world economy can be weaned off oil. In WA in our State Sustainability Strategy there is a section on Oil Vulnerability, the Gas Transition and the Hydrogen Economy. This set out the peak oil issue and began a process of examining what it could mean. It was a major reason why the state backed a Hydrogen Fuel Cell Bus trial as it helped us to begin to work on these issues of transition away from oil. There is a long way to go and in all these issues it is important that federal support and co-ordination with other states is built in from the start. Some of the ideas set out below need to be established as programs through an **Office of Oil Vulnerability**.

Cities need to become more urban and the countryside more rural

2. Build cities with reduced car dependence

The world's cities existed and thrived before the age of oil; it is possible to imagine them transitioning to a future where oil is no longer needed. Car dependence is the problem that drives oil vulnerability. I have spent the past thirty years gathering data with Jeff Kenworthy on cities and automobile dependence since I was first made aware of the oil issue in California. We have shown that US cities are the most vulnerable with annual consumption of around 56 GJ of fuel per person, Australian cities were next with around 34 GJ, compared to European cities at 17 GJ and Asian cities at 6 GJ per person. This huge variation is due to the density of the cities and their provision of viable alternatives in the form of public transport, walking and cycling—especially rail which seems to be the catalyst for a different kind of city.

The solution is a combination of transport infrastructure and land use policy as well as household education programs such as *TravelSmart* which have successfully reduced car use. This has been recognised by all Australian cities in their Metropolitan Strategies, all of which in recent years have developed policies to reduce car dependence. The major problems are not in the inner areas as these have similar fuel consumption per person to European cities, they are comparatively well off in terms of public transport infrastructure, and they are dense and mixed in their land use. However the newer suburbs in the outer areas, built in the past four or five decades, are heavily car dependent with fuel consumption similar to US cities. There are real equity issues here as the wealthy live mostly in inner areas and the poor increasingly are trapped on the fringe. Some households are using 40% of their income just to travel around to jobs and services. This will become intolerable after peak oil.

The first task therefore is to provide a crash program in public transport infrastructure for the middle and outer suburbs. Extensions of electric rail lines are the obvious way to go along with integrated local buses that can provide a service at least as quick as that provided by cars. Time savings will remain a bigger factor in determining mode of transport even under very high fuel costs.

The House of Representatives Report on Sustainable Cities which came out in 2005, recognises all of these things and recommends that infrastructure funds (especially for rail) be provided for our cities, especially in the middle and outer suburbs. Most national governments do this, even US cities already do this, and we need to see that it becomes a critical shift in federal policy in Australia. The money for such infrastructure is there in Canberra where substantial capital funds have now been accumulated. Also superannuation funds are ready to invest in our cities if a suitable mechanism can be found. Partnership funding of the required rail systems and integrated transport programs would follow if an **Urban Infrastructure Program** was begun. Perth's new rail system which has cost $2 billion and has given the city a 280 km modern electric rail system with 72 stations, was built without a cent of federal funds, though the freeway it passes down was funded almost entirely from federal coffers. This railway has been justified over many elections as a way of oil-proofing the city. There are many new developments planned around its stations to take advantage of this insurance and its obvious amenity now, but there is much of Perth that remains highly vulnerable to peak oil.

We cannot afford to build further and further out in Australian cities. Most Australian city plans recognise that the main task is to redevelop in the present urban area, especially in Transit Oriented Developments around rail lines. Cities need to be more urban and the countryside more rural. However there are many still who believe cities should be dispersed into rural areas as outlined above. Getting serious about oil depletion means that

rural lifestyles on the edge of the city cannot be facilitated and subsidised as they have been. There is a real clash between those who want to ruralise cities and those who realise the problems this creates in car dependence.

This does not mean that we do not try to create local eco-villages where people in cities can be more reliant on each other with reduced oil consumption as a result. Such places, like Christie Place in Adelaide, are essential to help us through this transition. But if they are an excuse to extend the city into areas that are better left rural, then they are not going to help.

Localism is the modus operandi for the post oil peak world

3. Build regions with reduced oil-dependence

The regions of Australia, outside our cities, have each been growing in their productivity based on cheap oil. Each region should now examine what it will mean for them if there is less oil each year from now on. In WA we have just completed our first Regional Sustainability Strategy in the Pilbara. The Strategy suggests that the Pilbara should become a demonstration region for how to become 'diesel free'. The Pilbara is well set up for this as it is in a period of growth where considerable investment is coming to the area thus enabling new things to be tried. And it has substantial resources of natural gas which it seems is the best short term transition fuel to replace oil. Yet all the big trucks, mining equipment and rail systems are powered by diesel and even power stations are mostly fuelled by diesel—largely imported from the Middle East. Technology exists for all of these systems to be transferred to run on local gas. A major partnership program should establish this demonstration and then create a large experiment to demonstrate how to convert the world's highest solar insolation rate into electricity to electrolyse water into hydrogen, eventually feeding this into the pipelines and liquefaction plants that are there. A bold vision for the Pilbara can demonstrate that there is a long term future for the region from which so much of the wealth of the country is derived. It can turn an Achilles heel issue for the Pilbara into a source of hope for the world.

Each natural resource management (NRM) region in Australia has in recent years been studied in great depth for the way in which agriculture, conservation and water management can be better integrated. They have been established with a governance system and a set of grants to begin implementing this NRM. None of these regions appears to have studied what are likely to be the implications if they have to face rapidly rising prices for diesel.

4. Rebuild agriculture

A lot of the literature on peak oil suggests that the biggest impact is going to be on agriculture. Certainly agriculture has become very dependent on diesel. In the analysis above I have tried to show that I do not expect our cities to begin taking over from rural producers in the production of food and fibre. In fact the loss of good agricultural soils to fringe urban suburbs and hobby farms has to stop as they are generally very unproductive as well as being highly car dependent. In the analysis above on Australian cities the fringe urban areas like the Central Coast in Sydney and Mornington Peninsula in Melbourne, are three to four times the average fuel consumption per person and eight times that of the inner city. If we are serious about oil depletion and sustainability in general we need to ensure that the countryside is more rural as well as the city being more urban.

One of the ways we can do this in Australian cities is to establish **Horticultural Precincts** immediately adjacent to our cities. These areas need to set aside the good soils and ensure they are retained in perpetuity for horticulture rather than always being seen as 'market garden superannuation' for the next suburb. In these areas we can then get serious about recycling wastewater as water corporations cannot invest in the pipes and technology for this unless they have certainty about the future for the area.

Agriculture will need to adapt by growing its own biodiesel, using gas and switching to more efficient rail transport rather than trucks. This transition will need assistance and subsidised diesel is not helping. A crash program in diesel phase-out could change agricultural oil vulnerability in a five year period.

One of the obvious ways that agriculture will need to change is to become more localised. When a flash flood cut the Nullabor a year ago there were trucks caught on either side and some food deteriorated, including a truck load of tomatoes on one side and a truck load of tomatoes on the other side. Such silliness will fall away when transport costs become significant in food distribution. There may be a reduction in choice as regional produce will be favoured over imported produce but this can be part of regional identity and the slow food movement, rather than deprivation. Do we really need to import vegetables from China—by plane? Wheat however is a bulk commodity which can be transported by train and ship at low oil or no oil cost. Agriculture needs to be more localised as well as creating surpluses which are traded for the benefit of regional and urban opportunity.

5. Facilitate localism

James H. Kunstler in *The Long Emergency* says that in response to peak oil 'Our lives will become profoundly and intensely local'. Localism is the required modus operandi for the post oil peak world, just as globalism was for the cheap oil era. Globalisation of the economy began with the first cities that began to trade beyond their immediate region—probably 4,000 years ago—and it

will continue under a post peak oil world. But its character will alter as the extent of trade and movement cannot be expected to continue as though its costs were unimportant. As mentioned above there are social movements that are beginning to push us more towards localism anyway: the need for local identity and sense of place; the slow food movement and its base in local foods; the ecocity movement with its desire to enable local community to be the basis managing local resources and local infrastructure.

The value of the internet and video conference facilities on our phones will become even more obvious to maintain the global interaction that we have tasted and will not easily give up. But in the same way that governments have facilitated businesses to export globally and have pushed international tourism, we now need to facilitate localism. I would suggest we need an **Office of Localism** with a program to fund innovations in localism. This can help to fund demonstrations: where there is a need to create industrial ecology of businesses that can share their wastes as resources or work together to ensure local resources are used and re-used; where local food linkages need to be linked up between peri-urban growers and urban communities to take direct supply of whatever is fresh; where local enterprises can be facilitated based on local resources and talents; where local tourism can be marketed to local people…

6. Regulate for the post-oil transition

A systematic review of regulations will show that at present we subsidise oil consumption, whether it be through the diesel rebate, the fringe benefits tax and salary packaging rules on cars and fuel, the subsidy on land development at the urban fringe (around $40,000 per block in most Australian cities), as well as the subsidy given to road users in the form of road building grants. Proactive regulation is also required to phase out the excessive use of four wheel drives and other gas guzzling cars with a clear phase-in program for gas-based electric hybrid cars. Lester Brown, through his Worldwatch Institute and now his Earth Institute, is one of the few broad commentators who have caught hold of the peak oil issue, but can still give a relatively optimistic view, suggests:

> *For the US automotive fuel economy, the key to greatly reducing oil use and carbon emissions is gas-electric hybrid cars. The average new car sold in the United States last year got 22 miles to the gallon, compared with 55 miles per gallon for the Toyota Prius. If the United States decided for oil security and climate stabilization reasons to replace its entire fleet of passenger vehicles with super-efficient gas-electric hybrids over the next 10 years, gasoline use could easily be cut in half. This would involve no change in the number of cars or miles driven, only a shift to the most efficient automotive propulsion technology now available.*
>
> *Beyond this, a gas-electric hybrid with an additional storage battery and a plug-in capacity would allow us to use electricity for short distance driving, such as the daily commute or grocery shopping. This could cut US gasoline use by an additional 20 percent, for a total reduction of 70 percent. Then if we invest in thousands of wind farms across the country to feed cheap electricity into the grid, we could do most short-distance driving with wind energy, dramatically reducing both carbon emissions and the pressure on world oil supplies.*
>
> *Using timers to recharge batteries with electricity coming from wind farms during the low demand hours between 1 and 6 a.m. costs the equivalent of 50¢-a-gallon gasoline. We have not only an inexhaustible alternative to dwindling reserves of oil, but an incredibly cheap one.*

The same potential to switch to lower fuel consuming vehicles has been there for 20 years. The market was going to look after this ('trust us' the motor vehicle manufacturers said) but instead we got four wheel drives for the trip to the supermarket and a reversal of the gain in fuel efficiency caused by the regulations of the 1970s. This cannot be allowed again—we must regulate for motor vehicles to transition away from oil. Governments can begin by regulating for their own fleets.

Aviation is a special case. There seems no alternative to oil on the horizon. The only solution it seems will be to allow gradual price increases to reduce unnecessary travel, to switch to fast trains for medium distance journeys, and to do more and more by internet conferencing (including family events). However, it would seem there would be a case to ensure that aviation had some priority on remaining fuel—this would also require some kind of regulation.

7. Prepare risk management scenarios for the future

Australia, and probably most advanced countries, have developed highly complex scenarios for dealing with terrorism. There are no such scenarios for dealing with oil vulnerability. We must get all our strategic analysts to take oil depletion seriously and see what must be done in short, medium and long term scenarios for reductions in oil supplies. The start of a process was there with the development of thinking about the Hydrogen Economy but this was only long term. We need to see how we can reach the future where there is no oil in a series of steps similar to the thoughts of Lester Brown above. We cannot afford to depend on the market to handle this as it will always see that cheap supplies of oil from the Middle East are the only thing we need to worry about and while they are expanding, we are not in trouble. They are not

and we cannot any longer just hope that they will continue to grow again. A new world is emerging where we must be much more clever or our vulnerability to oil in both cities and regions will be exposed.

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Tackling complex issues in an age of 'spin', 'framing', 'wedge politics', and the 'new normal'

by Barry Jones

Does the pursuit of truth and objectivity have a place in public life today? Dr Barry Jones is not optimistic.

Introduction

Although formal levels of education in Australia are far higher than ever before and access to information has increased exponentially in the past 40 years, the political process has been deformed. Ideology has largely dropped out of politics, and is replaced by convergence. Oppositions have generally ceased to oppose or propose an alternative basis for policy, and the concept 'there is no alternative' (the TINA principle) has been broadly accepted. Parliament has lost much of its moral authority and the public service has adopted the cult of managerialism and been increasingly partisan, committed to promoting the government 'line'. Universities have been forced to become trading corporations, the media is preoccupied with infotainment, while lobbying and use of consultants ensures that vested interest is more influential than community interest. Public life is dominated by the black arts of 'spin' and 'framing': the concept of the dialectic in which alternative cases, based on evidence, are debated vigorously has become anachronistic. Appeals to emotion, especially fear and gullibility, and to immediate economic or cultural self-interest ('wedge politics') are exploited cynically and ruthlessly. Establishing the truth of a complex proposition (evolution, stem cell research, climate change, going to war in Iraq, Industrial Relations changes) is less significant than how simple arguments, a.k.a. propaganda, can be sold. Since 2001, in the United States, in the age of the 'new normal' many policies (e.g. the outsourcing of torture) are now 'faith based', not evidence based, pre-Enlightenment, even pre-modern, and appointments are made on the basis of ideological commitment rather than competence.

I began talking about the information revolution in the 1970s, when the whole concept was very unfamiliar, and it did me no good at all in the Australian political process. Many of the subjects that I raised then, such as the impact of computers and global telecommunication, biotechnology, climate change and its implications, are now part of the conventional wisdom.

A major theme in my book *Sleepers, Wake!* was Australia's transition to an 'information society', where 40 per cent of the labour force is now employed. Information workers are in the mainstream, not the periphery. Industries such as film, music, entertainment, media are among the world's most powerful. Australia is essentially an 'information society', but a rather passive one.

There has been a completely inadequate Australian policy response on information issues, marked by poor coordination, intense fragmentation and suspicion between the major stakeholders and government departments, and an understandable reluctance to offend the major players—Murdoch, Packer and Stokes.

My repeated attempts to promote a National Information Policy, to set out principles of access and equity, failed utterly.

The Google search engine provides to a computer near you instant access to about 12 billion pages of material—far more than the holdings of the entire Library of Congress. That ought to mean that our participation in policy formulation ought to be increasingly sophisticated. I doubt this very much.

Historically there has never been a time when incumbency has counted for so much, and Oppositions for so little. The 'majoritarian' view ('well, we won, didn't we?') is based on a 'winner take all' philosophy, an assertion that

The new politics is based on changing brand loyalty

an elected government can claim a mandate for anything it wants—present or future, including retrospective justification for issues that were not specifically put before the electorate, such as invading Iraq in 2003.

'Winner take all' has strong support from the corporate sector and much of the media. Institutions which represent a countervailing force, or attempt to express an alternative point of view to government, such as the courts, trade unions and professional associations, universities and CSIRO, the ABC, are routinely denigrated, denied any claims to validity, legitimacy or the right to be consulted. Government is unrestrained in its appointment of like-minded zealots to boards such as the ABC or CSIRO, and in its adulation of the rich and powerful (the memorial service for Kerry Packer being an egregious example). Increasingly, legislation excludes ministerial actions from judicial review. Labor was little more than an appalled spectator to all this.

The politics of convergence

Oppositions, seeing themselves as 'governments-in-exile', no longer practice the concept of opposition and it might be easier to describe them as 'Acquiescences'. It is hard to identify a single Opposition in Australia in 2006 which is a credible threat to government, partly because both sides of politics have lost faith in using parliament as a forum where ideas can be challenged and argued out at length and in depth. Oppositions start from behind: they can only sell challenges, ideas, concepts, alternatives, vision and their potential/competence. If a party and its leader do not offer themselves as change agents, why would voters not opt for the status quo? If there is no dialectic no conflicting forces then there is no role for an Opposition. The new politics is based on changing brand loyalty (McDonald's or KFC): the product barely matters. That is the prevailing view among apparatchiks and they are incredulous that there could be another point of view.

There is a danger that politics becomes confused with administration, ideology is then hollowed out from politics, and it is hard for Oppositions to put a coherent alternative case and promote significant community debate.

(Policies appropriate for incumbents—stability, balanced budgets, efficiency—may be totally inappropriate for Oppositions, because if federal Labor says, 'we'll balance the books', the Howard government can say, 'but we are doing that already', and a promise *not* to spend (i.e. a commitment not to do anything new) won't enthuse the True Believers.)

Democracy is threatened by the gross imbalance in intellectual and organisational firepower available to governments and oppositions. I calculate that the resources available to the National ALP, including head office staff and policy advisors in Shadow Ministers' offices adds up to about 95 people, while government can call on policy and promotional support from thousands of professionals in departments. Resources available to governments, including huge advertising expenditure, enables them to undertake almost permanent campaigning.

Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court made a powerful attack on the use of expert advice in political decision making at a Conversazione at the Melbourne University Law School in October 2005. He accused Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration of having begun to subvert the democratic process by relying on the advice of experts. In a democratic society, where there is a conflict between experts and Joe Sixpack (the judge's term, not mine) on subjects such as abortion, stem cell research, the Middle East and the burning of witches, the outcome must depend on democratic, majoritarian decisions, not on expert knowledge. He expressed no view as to whether Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States should be displaced by Joe Sixpack and his friends.

On major issues, it is depressingly common to hear the mantra, 'there is no alternative' (TINA). The task of government and its advisers is to find a formula, or sales-pitch, try it out on focus groups, call in consultants, put a spin on it and use all the propaganda resources that our taxes can provide to sell it. The concept of the dialectic, or the Socratic dialogue, where an argument is proposed, supporting evidence led, a contrary position put, then examined rigorously and a conclusion or verdict reached is now confined to the law courts, or royal commissions. It has dropped out of politics. Economics, which used to be a subject of heated debate, is now a matter of assertion, although Hugh Stretton, John Mathews, John Quiggin and Kenneth Davidson maintain a lonely and courageous dissent.

Compared to Great Britain, the Australian parliament has very rigid parliamentary discipline, members rarely cross the floor, debates rarely change the result of a vote, members face impossible deadlines (for example Senate scrutiny of the IR and anti-terror legislation) and as membership increases, sitting time decreases. The House then becomes little more than an Electoral College to choose the Executive. (In my 26 years as MP, federal and state, I only cast three conscience votes).

The first question that should have been debated in 2001 on the refugee issue was: 'would entry of up to 4,000 refugees from the Middle East in 2001 have a greater or lesser impact on Australia than 20,000 Vietnamese in 1981 or 20,000 Chinese in 1989?' But that question was never asked. Instead the TINA formula was adopted and framed not to ask a question but to make an assertion: 'Australia is under threat of invasion'. The Opposition convinced itself that a compassionate policy on refugees

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would be a vote loser, especially in Queensland and Western Australia, and chose to accept that the refugees were a threat to national security. The issue then became, 'who would be tougher on refugees? Howard or Beazley?' (Beazley observed that there was not 'a cigarette paper of difference' between his position and Howard's on security issues.)

If the Opposition fails to put a strong alternative case on a contentious issue such as refugees, the media can then say, 'the government has achieved consensus so there is no issue to write about'. There is another practical objection: if both parties are competing for the middle ground, with the Opposition refusing to argue an alternative policy, there will be an immediate advantage for the incumbent, unless the government is in crisis, especially if it has more resources and a stronger leader.

This involves reviving vigorous partisan debate and avoiding false consensus inspired by fear of giving offence, understanding the dialectic. Leaders become *followers* of public opinion and (John Howard aside) don't seek to change outcomes. In the politics of convergence, in federal politics Australia has (like the US) sometimes been a *de facto* one party system. All too often, federal Labor did not challenge orthodoxy: it was a pillar of orthodoxy. 'Differentiation' is marginalised, less on policy or values, more on personality or style.

We must redefine and assert the public interest and the public good, while recognising that in practice vested interest (and the power of lobbyists) has been far more significant in decision making than general or community interest (e.g. private health v. Medicare, private v. public hospitals, private v. public schools, coal industry v. environmentalists.) We have some consolation that our political situation is far better than the US where the gun lobby, the private health lobby, big tobacco, big pharmas and big oil can paralyse action by Congress.

The cult of management has become a dominant factor in public life

The 'hollowing out' of expertise

A disturbing change in my life time has been co-option of the public service to promote the government's political agenda. Historically, a great strength in Australia's public service was that its outstanding figures, including Sir Arthur Tange, Sir Roland Wilson, Sir John Crawford and Dr H.C. 'Nugget' Coombs gave frank and fearless advice to both Labor and Coalition governments. Now Department heads are often appointed on contract, after advice from consultancy firms, with the clear (even if unwritten) assumption that reappointment or promotion will depend on their skills in defending the government position when it comes under attack, or telling the government what it wants to hear. John Howard often claims to be a disciple of Menzies, but it is certainly not true in public service areas. When Menzies became Prime Minister again in December 1949 he retained most of Chifley's senior advisors. When colleagues urged Menzies to remove Coombs, he replied, 'I have any number of people around me who will tell me what they think I want to hear. I need to have access to people who will tell me the opposite'. Arthur Fadden, his Treasurer, took the same view.

Since the 1980s, the cult of management has become a dominant factor in public life, exactly as James Burnham had predicted in *The Managerial Revolution*. In Britain in the Thatcher era, and in Australia, after 1983, there was a growing conviction that expertise might create serious distortions in policy making, and that generic managers, usually accountants, or economists, would provide an overall detached view. Otherwise, health specialists would push health issues, educators education, scientists science, and so on.

At its most brutal the argument was put that there are no health, education, transport, environment or media problems, only management problems: get the management right, and all the other problems will disappear. Coupled with this idea was the reluctance of senior officials to give what used to be called 'frank and fearless' advice. Generic managers promoted the use of 'management-speak', a coded form far removed from natural language. It helped protect insiders from open enquiry. Treasury and Finance has provided two successive Secretaries of the Victorian Department of Education. The chance that Treasury would be headed by an experienced teacher appears to be remote.

Don Watson's admirable books *Weasel Words* and *Death Sentence* opened up debate on 'management-speak' and its threat to public discourse, a phenomenon that George Orwell predicted in his essay 'Politics and the English Language'.

In this deformed language, citizens, passengers, patients, patrons, audiences, taxpayers, even students, all became 'customers', as if the trading nexus was the most important defining element in life. All values were commercial, with a dollar equivalent.

In the UK, crises in the privatised rail services, mad cow disease (BSE), foot and mouth disease (FMD), ignorance about the Middle East, are now recognised as having been exacerbated by the hollowing out of expertise: relevant departments have more managers, fewer experts, industries are self-regulated, accountability, responsibility and transparency have declined.

Politics is increasingly reported as a subset of the entertainment industry, in which it is assumed that the audience looks for instant responses and suffers from short term memory. Politics is treated as a sporting contest, with its violence, personality clashes, tribalism and quick outcomes. An alternative model is politics as theatre or drama. The besetting fault of much media reporting is trivialisation, exaggerated stereotyping, playing off personalities—and a general 'dumbing down'. This encourages the view that there is no point in raising serious issues months or years before an election. This has the effect of reinforcing the status quo, strengthening the government's grip on the agenda.

The public intellectual is in retreat

One useful lesson can be drawn from the world of sport. Outcomes, whether a football match, horse race, swimming event or sprint may depend on last minute factors—the state of the track, a tactical error, or an injury—so that those who argue that final outcomes depend on last minute, unpredictable factors are right, at least in part. Public opinion polling suggests that the campaign itself generates a high degree of volatility, with surprising surges in voting trends, which ultimately tend to flatten out. Nevertheless, there is persuasive evidence that the final outcome reflects a more settled view of the electorate—that what the polls were reporting six months before election day may be more reliable than a poll held six days before election day.

But, to resume the sporting analogy, even though the match/contest/poll may turn on short-term factors, does this mean that a team or party has no need to set out a long-term strategy, no need to train until the last minute, no need to choose and promote talent? Of course not. In that sense, both the short-term and long-term perspectives are correct, and they are inextricably linked.

The level of community involvement in public debate is depressingly low. Other than public demonstrations against the Howard government's workplace relations legislation, there is a low level of awareness, interest or even outrage, in public issues. The Hicks case barely registers, the execution of Van Nguyen in Singapore generated more private grief than public outrage, and death sentences on two of the Bali nine have barely impacted on the community. Aboriginal reconciliation and protests about the Iraq War and the reasons for our involvement in it have fallen off the agenda.

A consultant has been defined as somebody to whom you lend your watch, then ask him to tell you the time. Consultants, eager for repeat business, provided government with exactly the answers that they want to receive. Lobbyists, many of them former politicians or bureaucrats, are part of the decision making inner circle.

The rise of 'wedge politics'

As the Western world moved towards media saturation, advertising, public relations and psychological manipulation became increasingly important, transforming how politics operated. In 1977 the novelist Saul Bellow referred to use of the word 'spin' (as in 'to spin a yarn') as a technique for deception. The term 'spin doctors', describing experts who developed techniques for manipulating how a message was received, came into common use during the Reagan-Mondale presidential debates in the year 1984, an irony that George Orwell would have noted. The factual basis of a story was of little relevance—the main issue was 'will it sell?'

Don't Think of an Elephant by George Lakoff describes 'wedge politics' and 'dog whistle politics' in the US and also analyses the importance of 'framing' issues, something which the Right in the US is skilful at. Howard has been good at 'framing'—for example—'the war on terror' so that any objection to his suspension of the rule of law is denounced as anti-American or unpatriotic. If Howard then sets the agenda, and Labor acquiesces, then the prospect of opening up the argument disappears.

Getting in first with defining language is critically important. People who tried to kill themselves at the Baxter Detention Centre might have gained sympathy if their actions were called 'suicide attempts', but not if defined as 'attention seeking incidents'. 'Refugees' or 'queue jumpers'? 'Academics' or 'members of the chattering classes'? 'Terrorists' or 'martyrs'? 'Accountability' or 'playing the blame game'? 'Security' or 'rigidity'? 'Insecurity' or 'flexibility'? 'Strategic withdrawal' or 'cutting and running'? 'Reform' or 'change'? 'Serious analysis' or 'navel-gazing'?

'Wedge politics', a further development of spin, an extreme public relations technique, combining misinformation and propaganda, evolved in the late 1980s, just before the Cold War ended.

'Wedge politics' is essentially the old technique of 'divide and rule', persuading the poor and defenceless to defer to the interests of the rich and powerful rather than making common cause with each other.

Adolf Hitler did not use the term 'wedge politics' but he developed the concept. It essentially uses democratic forms, the will of a majority, in an oppressive way, without the restraint of a historic liberal, pluralistic tradition, lacking scepticism, transparency and the separation of power.

The essence of 'wedge politics' is finding a natural fault-line in society, then driving a wedge into it, widening the gap between the larger and smaller segments. 'Wedge politics' is designed to appeal to a majority group in an

election winning strategy, even at the cost of creating or perpetuating deep divisions in society ('it's us versus them') by marginalising or denigrating minorities. The term was coined by Lee Atwater (1951-1991), a brilliant and destructive Republican strategist who worked for President George Bush, Senior. 'Wedge politics' was used with devastating effect against the Democrat Michael Dukakis in the 1988 Presidential election. Before Atwater's early death from a brain tumour he converted to Catholicism and apologised to Dukakis and some other victims. 'Wedge politics' was perfected as an art form by Karl Rove who works for President George W. Bush.

Practitioners of 'wedge politics' would target their message to English speakers v. cultural minorities, Europeans v. non-Europeans, homeowners v. the homeless, the secure v. the dispossessed, non-unionists v. unionists, heterosexuals v. homosexuals, so that minorities such as Muslims, refugees, intellectuals, cultural elites can be dismissed as irrelevant or alien to mainstream society.

The role of universities

At a time when the world's leaders are responding to increasingly complex problems with disturbingly superficial policy responses, universities are under serious threat. University Vice-Chancellors are between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Most Australian universities have been forced away from their traditional roles as communities of scholars to become businesses, making a significant contribution to Australia's export income. Universities have become increasingly instrumental and less speculative. In a market driven society, this is inevitable because, in the short term, the instrumental areas are where jobs are to be found. A degree in business studies is likely to make a precise fit in the job market. (Enron, Arthur Andersen and HIH were full of them).

Degrees that try to explain the meaning of life are currently at a discount in many universities but not, I'm glad to report, at the University of Melbourne. Universities have less to spend proportionally for expanding knowledge, pushing back the frontiers of the unknown—the traditional areas of university concern: philosophy, history, geography, the classics, literature, music, physics, chemistry, mathematics, archaeology, anthropology, astronomy. Law, medicine and the life sciences are expanding, but marketing, management and IT courses are doing best of all, answering the 'how?' questions, not the 'why?'. The most rapidly expanding departments generally are in the packaging subjects, marketing and business studies.

Professional activity and work loads in Australia's forty universities have increased almost exponentially in the past 20 years, but the public intellectual is in retreat. Australia has more paid academics than at any time in our history, but across the nation they have fallen strangely silent. But where are they when we need them? With a population of 20.5 million, and leaving aside people in the creative arts and politics, it is disturbingly hard to identify even 40 public intellectuals who (i) have emerged through the university system, (ii) contribute to public debate outside their own discipline and (iii) get a run in the media when they do.

The term 'academic' is routinely used in a denigratory way—to mean remote, pedantic, impractical or irrelevant. The only consolation is that in the longer term it is elite opinion that wins out.

Establishing the truth of a complex proposition may in practice be less significant than how simple arguments, a.k.a. propaganda, can be sold, votes won from special interest groups and campaign donations from industry sectors.

Current examples of current controversies over complex issues include:

- Evolution v. creationism or intelligent design
- 'Knowledge Nation'
- Stem cells—limitations on the use of embryonic steam cells, and prohibition on therapeutic cloning (as opposed to reproductive cloning)
- Climate change
- Industrial relations changes
- Going to war in Iraq
- The war on terror.

I will not have time to discuss all these issues, and will confine my comments to the last two.

The American essayist and novelist Joan Didion, writing in the *New York Review of Books*, deplored the oversimplification and infantilisation of debate in the United States after September 11, with heavy emphasis on 'effects' and the need to 'take action', and very little analysis of 'causes'.

Inquiry into the nature of the enemy we faced, in other words, was to be interpreted as sympathy for that enemy. The final allowable word on those who attacked us was to be that they were 'evildoers', or 'wrongdoers', peculiar constructions which served to suggest that those who used them were transmitting messages from some

Establishing the truth of a complex proposition may in practice be less significant than how simple arguments … can be sold

ultimate authority. This was a year in which it would come to seem as if we had been plunged at one fell stroke into a pre-modern world. The possibilities of the Enlightenment vanished. We had suddenly been asked to accept—and were in fact accepting—a kind of reasoning so extremely fragile that it might have been based on the promised return of the cargo gods.

Deformation of language and meaning, and convergence between advertising slogans and public information is deliberate, not coincidental.

Nor was the repeating of phrases, just a few words ('They hate freedom!', 'The American people are safer!'), over and over, with its appeal to the lowest common denominator of understanding, in sharp contrast to Abraham Lincoln's subtle and nuanced words nearly a century and a half earlier.

On 27 February 1860, Lincoln delivered a very complex speech, about slavery and its political implications, at the Cooper Union in New York.

It was the first speech he ever made in New York City and its impact was dramatic. He concluded with the words, which may seem anachronistic now, 'Let us have faith that right makes might…' Four New York newspapers published the full text, all 7,500 words, and it was reprinted hundreds of times. It rapidly transformed Lincoln from being merely a Midwestern 'favourite son' to a national figure, and was a major factor in securing him the Republican nomination for President in May.

In 1860 the technology was primitive but the ideas in Lincoln's speech were profound and sophisticated. In 2004, the technology is sophisticated but the ideas uttered by the presidential candidates are primitive and over-simplified: it would be easier to imagine a mantra, such as, 'we have made America stronger', being repeated a thousand times.

Faith, war and the 'new normal'

On 21 October 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney, in justifying use of executive power to restrict civil liberties, limit access to courts, restrict debate, and cripple Freedom of Information legislation told *The Washington Post*: 'Many of the steps we have now been forced to take will become permanent in American life, part of a 'new normalcy' [sic] that reflects an understanding of the world as it is.'

In the United States, writers are now adopting, and some promoting, the term the 'new normal'. In this view, the 'old normal', where decisions might have been based on evidence, analysis, reason and judgment, using techniques refined by the Enlightenment of the 18th century, had come to an end on 9/11. The 'new normal' depended on instant decisions based on 'gut', 'instinct' and 'faith'. Increasingly, policies have to be 'faith based'.

On 28 June 2006, the Google search engine lists 615,000,000 citations of the 'new normal'—no need to read them all—but the term has had virtually no currency outside the United States.

Invading Iraq was a 'faith based' decision, not 'evidence based'

To quote Joan Didion again:

> *The 'new normal' required that we adopt a 'new paradigm' which in turn required, according to an internal White House memo signed by President Bush, 'new thinking in the law of war', in other words a reconsideration of the Geneva Conventions prohibitions against torture. 'Torture'…had become 'extreme interrogation', which under the 'new paradigm' could be justified when the information obtained by interrogation failed to tally with the information required by policy…*
>
> *The word 'truth'…had been redefined, the empirical method abandoned: 'the truth' was now whatever we needed it to be, the confirmation of those propositions or policies in which we 'believed in our hearts', or had 'faith'…It was now possible to 'believe' in one proposition or another on the basis of no evidence that it was so…as if the existence of weapons [of mass destruction] was a doctrinal point on the order of transubstantiation…*
>
> *'I do not believe we should change our course because I believe in it', Tony Blair was saying by September 2003. 'I carry on doing the job because I believe in what I am doing.'*

The Bush Administration is encouraging 'faith-based' schools, charities, prisoner rehabilitation and even national parks (the last promoting the creationist explanation that God formed the Grand Canyon in six days).

Francis Wheen reminds us that in 1800 the U.S. Presidential election was a contest between John Adams, president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Thomas Jefferson, president of the American Philosophical Society. In the 2000 contest, the contenders, George W. Bush and Al Gore, were both 'born-agains', and Gore sported a sign on his desk which read 'WWJD?' ('What would Jesus do?').

It is ironic that the United States, with the world's greatest universities and an unequalled record of scientific achievement, should have an enormous anti-science constituency. Nearly 50 per cent of Americans consider *Genesis* to be the final authority on the creation of the world, a significant minority are doubtful about a heliocentric universe, 40 per cent believe that angels exist and 75 per cent reject Darwin's theory of evolution.

Australia is a strikingly secular society compared to the United States, where religious observance is high and

religion, including fundamentalist religion, is influential in politics, education, health and research, despite the clear separation of Church and State set out in the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, rates of homicide, sexually transmitted diseases, abortion and teen pregnancy are far higher in the 'bible belt' of the U.S. than in secular Australia.

In an era of 'twin fundamentalisms', Christian and Islamic, when proponents insist, 'I am carrying out God's will', God does not intervene to confirm which view is correct. One of the disturbing issues of the 21st century is why the United States, with its sophisticated knowledge base in research, industry, arts, literature and music should have a primitive, fundamentalist attitude to politics, religion and understanding the outside world. Both Bush and Blair are sympathetic to 'creation science' and 'intelligent design' being included in the syllabus of public schools.

Fundamentalist rhetoric in the United States contributed to a radical simplification of foreign policy as the struggle between forces of light v. forces of darkness. Peter Singer drew attention to Bush's use of the word 'evil' as a noun 914 times over two years in speeches made as President, raising 'the question of what meaning evil can have in a secular modern world'. The significance of the invocation of evil is that it avoids the need for evidence, analysis, thought or working through complexity. The forces of anti-Christ are easier to attack if personalised, as they have been in the United States for generations: Hitler, Tojo, Stalin, Mao, the two Kims, Ho, Castro, Gaddafi, Aideed, Khomeini, Saddam.

Primary justification for war against Iraq was asserted to be its possession of weapons of mass destruction, links between Iraq and al-Qaida over September 11, Iraq's immediate threats to its neighbours, the region and the United States, and its failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions on 'proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'. A fifth justification, 'regime change', was specifically repudiated by Tony Blair and John Howard before fighting began.

Invading Iraq was a 'faith based' decision, not 'evidence based'.

Hans Blix and the United Nations weapons inspection team and Secretary-General Kofi Annan were attempting to verify whether the weapons existed and were useable. They were contemptuously rejected because they operated under the 'old normal', where evidence was relevant and time was needed for verification.

Under the 'old normal', I had grown up with the assumption that our side, the democracies, never began wars, even when our opponents were evil, and when a pre-emptive strike might have been to our immediate advantage. This assumption no longer applies, and the moral basis for action is now displaced by sheer opportunism and adventurism.

Torture is now routinely justified instead of being outlawed. The arguments 'we only torture in a good cause' and 'if they can do it, so can we…' should have been dismissed out of hand, but were not. We should have asked, 'how are torturers recruited? Self selection? Going with the flow? Does the Eichmann defence of "superior orders" apply?'.

The rule of law, presumption of innocence, access to courts and legal representation can all be withdrawn at will. Violence and sexual humiliation of prisoners was routinely carried out by American military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison, itself a dark memorial to Saddam's abuses, until media disclosures forced a change in practice. Torture seems to have been privatised, and contracted out. Freedom of Information requests are not answered and 'plausible deniability' becomes the norm.

Albert Camus wrote: 'Man's greatness lies in his decision to be stronger than his condition. And if his condition is unjust, he has only one way of overcoming it, which is to be just himself.'

What happened to the rule of law? Presumption of innocence? Constitutional guarantees? They only apply when convenient. There are no absolutes.

The 'new normal' is pre-modern in its rejection of objective evidence. Glaucon's argument in favour of the rule of force that Socrates dismissed so convincingly in Plato's *Republic* is now current again. The Salem witch-trials provoked Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*. Will 'faith based' politics stimulate a new generation of playwrights and essayists, or will they all be employed as spin doctors?

We live in an era of instinctive, reactive and ill-informed leadership, marked by contempt for truth, and endorsement of the dictum that 'the end justifies the means'. It hardly matters whether that view is driven by cynicism or ideology. Lying is now standard operating practice in government. The use of 'dirt files', while not new, is now pursued more avidly in the context of the new brutalism in politics: 'Win at all costs! Take no prisoners!'

My life has been driven by an overwhelming drive for knowledge about the past and trying to work out how to create a better world. What caused World Wars I and II and the Great Depression? Why did Nazism and Stalinism achieve such power? How can terrible events be prevented? My priorities have been to dig up as much evidence as possible in the shortest time and I was obsessed about getting things right. I tried to apply Karl Popper's test of 'falsifiability', that proponents of a hypothesis must be able to propose a protocol for testing, leading to confirmation on refutation. I worried about 'group think', only seeking views from people with the same mind set, always pleased to confirm what a superior wants to hear.

I recognise that my capacity to understand another point of view, to grasp the case against some course of action, to comprehend complexity and avoid oversimplification would be disabling factors in contemporary politics.

The most troubling aspect of the Bush and Blair reaction to September 2001 was a lack of elementary curiosity, 'why has this happened? What are the deep causes?', and a preoccupation with effects, at the expense of causes. Intellectually, Bush never leaves home. He takes home with him: it's Texas everywhere.

We have to ask *why* things happen, why hatred and violence is an instinctive reaction, and use analysis and reason to pursue peace and security. The cycle of eye for eye, tooth for tooth, will lead to a blind and toothless world. Even if it leads to some delay, there must be examination of alternative explanations, and room for scepticism and irony, even after sudden tragedy.

In the United States, Britain and Australia intelligence agencies failed spectacularly in predicting acts of terrorism, and they became convenient scapegoats for government mistakes. The lack of foreign language expertise in the CIA, State Department and Defense Department cost the United States, and the cause of world peace, dearly. During the 1990s, Arab speakers were weeded out of important agencies and replaced by MBAs, people generally lacking in experience of or understanding of cultures other than their own. With limited local or expert knowledge, not enough scepticism, they were expected to become cheer squads for government, which misread or exaggerated their findings. Inevitably they placed excessive reliance on tainted sources of information, men in suits who spoke English, refugees or exiles from Iraq who had a message to sell, and sold it.

Our species is infinitely complex, infinitely precious, infinitely vulnerable, infinitely destructive, but also infinitely capable of the sublime and transcendent. We must continue to aspire to the universal, to explore the galaxy, to explain mysteries, of which humans are the most perplexing.

Australia, and my party too, must make a commitment to restoring the primacy of reason, rejecting a paranoid view of history and 'telling truth to power'. As he lay dying, Tolstoy reaffirmed his commitment to rationality: 'Even in the valley of the shadow of death two plus two does not make six'. When Primo Levi was a prisoner in Auschwitz, he broke off an icicle and sucked it to relieve his thirst, until a guard knocked it out of his hand. 'Why?' ('Warum?'), he asked. The guard replied, 'here is no why'. ('Hier is kein Warum.') In too many of our public acts, there is no 'why?'. Our blind adoption of irrational policies, supine and unquestioning acquiescence to anything the US proposes is potentially destructive. Our democratic society depends on insisting on answers to the 'why?' questions.

The optimistic note on which I hoped to end *A Thinking Reed*, with autumnal light glinting on the leaves and hills of the landscape ahead, has eluded me. Howard's victory in 2004 could be explained rationally but Bush's win was more worrying, suggesting that the world had moved into a post-rational era.

I live in the spirit of Beckett's words:

> *It will be I? It will be the silence, where I am? I don't know. I'll never know, in the silence you don't know. You must go on. I can't go on. I'll go on.*

This article is a slightly edited version of a paper given at the University of Melbourne's Dean of Arts' Public Lecture Series on 28 June 2006.

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Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Morality

by C.A.J. (Tony) Coady

How do we define terrorism? Can it ever be justified? Professor Tony Coady offers a new analysis of terrorism, what it is and why it is wrong, as well as of the moral dangers posed by recent counter-terrorist activity.

Terrorism has the capacity to surprise in many different ways. One that has often been remarked is that the widespread fear and anxiety about terrorism is out of proportion to the damage that terrorists actually inflict. This is true of the majority of terrorist attacks perpetrated by sub-state groups, though it is hardly true of state terrorism. But many people fail to consider state terrorism, and many even think it a contradiction in terms. This is one of several reasons why we need to consider the definition of terrorism before proceeding further with the discussion of its normative dimensions and of the moral problems involved in reactions to it.

Victims or potential victims of contemporary terrorism are also surprised by it because they find its motivations incomprehensible. In particular, citizens of the affluent democratic nations find the hatred directed at them hard to understand and they are specially baffled by the phenomenon of suicide bombing. I would not want to deny that there may be elements of strangeness in the motivations of those who blow themselves up in crowded Bali bars or fly captured aeroplanes into Manhattan buildings, but, as I shall argue below, terrorism is best viewed as a violent tactic in pursuit of political or quasi-political ends, and much of the astonishment that 'they' are attacking 'us' results from a failure to take a fully global perspective on the relevant motivations. When President Bush told some American schoolchildren that the terrorists of 9/11 'hate us because we're so good' he was not merely sentimentalising the moral status of the American people, he was also ignoring the contentious role of American military and economic power throughout the world. In this, he reflected a general local perception that the widespread military, intelligence and economic network maintained by the US government throughout the world has an entirely benign function.

This sort of perception is not unique to the USA: it has been present amongst the ruling elites and the common people of every imperial power. Even a philosopher as intelligent and enlightened as John Stuart Mill had a similar blind spot about the workings of the British Empire. Writing in 1859, Mill found critics of British Imperial policy to be incomprehensibly blind to the outstanding virtues of British foreign policy. He thought that Britain's altruistic behaviour in foreign affairs was 'a novelty in the world' since its 'declared principle of policy' was 'to let other nations alone'. He asserts that: 'Any attempt it makes to exert influence over (other nations), even by persuasion, is rather in the service of others than of itself…' And there is much more in the same lofty vein. Mill is genuinely astonished that foreigners take a different view of Britain's imperial progress, but we can now see the elements of exploitation, domination and injustice that eluded him, just as many others on the receiving end of imperial power saw it then. Similarly today with the hegemonic sway of the United States and, in lesser degree, with the activities of its powerful allies.

Indeed, the more integrated the world becomes in terms of communications, economics, and technology, the more scope there is for the perception, articulation and growth of resentment at the real and imagined injustices of the world order that the great powers and their allies are widely seen to support or at least benefit from. When people insist on understanding the root causes of contemporary terrorism as part of the response to it, they are pointing in part to this widespread phenomenon. They are not trying to justify or even excuse terrorism, rather they want the comfortable world to abandon the blinkers that make possible President Bush's remark and which earlier distorted Mill's vision of the British Empire. It is no response to point out that most of the leaders of terrorist campaigns are not themselves desperately poor, malnourished, persecuted or uneducated. Indeed not, but they see themselves, and, more importantly, are seen by many who do suffer, as speaking and acting on their behalf.

A sense of grievance or outrage at the persistent operation of injustice (real or perceived) has always been a powerful motivation for resort to retaliatory or corrective violence. Those who take this route will always be perceived as heroes amongst the many on whose behalf they purport to act. Of course, not all resort to politically and morally

motivated violence need be terrorist, as I shall argue below, but the motivations for, and supportive reactions to, terrorist and non-terrorist violence will often overlap.

Suicide bombing, for instance, is often perceived by its target populations and governments as a wholly novel phenomenon, motivated by opaque religious fanaticism, unrelated to comprehensible political objectives. Yet this is mostly misperception. Japanese Kamikaze pilots, who sought to halt the Allied advance in the Pacific, pre-dated Palestinian and al Qaeda suicide bombers by 50 to 60 years. They had clear military and political objectives and were principally motivated by nationalist ideology rather than religion. Similarly, as Robert Pape has argued persuasively, a great deal of contemporary suicide bombing is directly correlated with resistance to military occupation or to the military presence of foreign troops. There are undoubtedly religious factors involved in many such attacks but they cannot be considered in isolation from the perceptions of grievance against the global reach of foreign military and economic power, especially (though not exclusively) that of the United States. The Kamikaze pilots were not, of course, attacking non-combatants and so, on the argument I present below, they were not terrorists. Neither are those contemporary suicide bombers who attack military or quasi-military targets, but this brings us to the definition of terrorism.

The definition of terrorism

At this point, we need to think more clearly about what terrorism is. After all, how can we talk sensibly about the topic unless we know what the topic is? Widespread disarray amongst theorists about what to count as terrorism suggests the importance of declaring a definitional position at the outset and noting its major intellectual and moral implications. This is particularly significant when the theoretical disarray also reflects confusions in public debates about the issues. We should not, however, expect that definition of such a contentious term will capture 'the concept' of terrorism as if there is only one understanding of the term at work in political discussions. What is important is to produce a definition that will do two things. First, it should cover some of the central features of the way the expression is widely used, and second, it should link the conceptual analysis to significant moral and political debates in a way that gives us some chance of advancing them.

My proposal, which I have defended more fully elsewhere, is to concentrate on one key element exhibited by common responses to and fears about terrorism, namely the idea that it involves 'innocent' victims. This element features in various ways in many definitional proposals and in much of the heated debate about the evils of terrorism. It also usefully provides a point of connection with the moral apparatus of just war theory, specifically the principle of discrimination and its requirement of non-combatant immunity. Of course, terrorism does not always take place in the context of all-out international war, but it usually has a war-like dimension. I will define it as follows: the organised use of violence to attack non-combatants or innocents (in a special sense) or their property for political purposes. I shall call this definition, and others like it, 'tactical definitions' because they focus on the means and intermediate goals used to pursue political ends. This is the core idea behind the concept of terrorism as I understand it. It is a pretty minimal, pared down definition because it leaves out certain things that some other theorists who are sympathetic to my approach would include. I say nothing of the further or instrumental purposes for which the tactic is used beyond the political orientation.

Other theorists would include such elements as the aim of creating fear, the targeting of one group with the intention of influencing a second group and so on. I avoid these further complications for reasons of theoretical economy and in order to leave as much room as possible for empirical investigation of terrorists' motives and purposes. We could pursue these definitional issues further, but for now the core idea can be treated as a guidepost, to which more details can be added according to intellectual taste and the desire for more specific and contentious restrictions or expansions.

By contrast, however, there are other approaches that are not expansions or restrictions of the tactical definition, but directly conflict with it. These approaches view terrorism essentially in terms of the use of political violence by those who are unauthorised to use it. I shall call these political status definitions. Some of these definitions make it clear that only sub-state agents can engage in terrorism, others are vaguer but tend to imply this. The motivation behind political status definitions is the desire to locate terrorism as a phenomenon, or as an object of concern, in the arena of civic order and to present terrorism solely as a threat to the civic order maintained by states. Political status definitions often mention attacks upon the innocent as one important type of terrorism, but they treat this as incidental to the main point. It should be clear that I find this conceptual location unsatisfactory. This is not only because it makes unavailable the natural characterisation of 'terrorism' in the case of certain tactics involved in war between states, but also because it allows only for one-sided application of the term in conflicts between state authorities and sub-state revolutionary or resistance groups.

Defects of the 'political status' approach

By contrast, my version of a tactical definition (like others similar to it) has quite different consequences. One is that states can themselves use terrorism (either against other states or against sub-state groups), another is that much political violence by non-state agents will

not be terrorist. Some are inclined to ignore or resist these possibilities, but if we see terrorism as a particular kind of employment of political violence then we should surely be impressed by analogies and identities between methods used rather than dissimilarities between the powers and standings of the agents using them. We should not hesitate to use the vocabulary of terrorism to describe Russian attacks upon innocent Chechens, just as Chechens have used terrorism in attacking innocent Russians. Germany and Japan made a practice of deliberate bombing and massacre of non-combatant populations during the Second World War (and earlier in the case of Japan's massacres in China). For their part, the Allies deliberately bombed German civilian population centres creating a colossal slaughter of innocents in World War II, as did the Americans in the fire-bombing of Japan culminating in the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is a second consequence of the tactical definition that, unlike the political status approach, it allows that non-state political violence need not be terrorist. The conflict here between the tactical and the political status approaches has important moral and political implications because not only is there a widespread belief that terrorism is always wrong, but there are good arguments (as we shall see) to show that it is at least presumptively morally wrong and other arguments designed to show that it is always morally wrong. Hence, if states cannot engage in terrorism, and all political violence directed against the state by sub-state or non-state groups is terrorist, the moral odds are stacked against all revolutionary or dissenting violence. But this collapses the possibility of important distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violent threats to civic order, between certain types of just and unjust revolutionary violence. Though I have no enthusiasm for revolutionary violence as such, I think it wise to preserve the possibility of justified revolutionary violence that can not only plead a just cause but also avoid the charge of terrorism. Countries like the United States that were founded on violent revolution should have an interest in distinguishing between revolutions that employ terrorism and those that do not.

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The status definition also renders illegitimate certain obvious complaints that revolutionaries, or, for that matter, innocent third parties themselves can make in the vocabulary of terrorism against certain violent activities of state authorities. It is natural to speak of state terrorism when the state attempts to stamp out revolutionary activity by threatening, harming or killing peasants, intellectuals, workers or villagers who are not themselves engaged in violence. It is particularly important to make this point in the current climate of the 'war against terrorism' since there are a variety of governments throughout the world who are using the anti-terrorist campaign to deal drastically with all internal or secessionist opposition—and often to deal with it in ways that raise the question of state terrorism, a point to which we shall return below. There is, of course, no need to deny that the use of terror by non-state groups rather than by the state raises special theoretical issues.

Non-combatant status and the wrong of terrorism

I have used the term 'non-combatants' to signal a connection with just war theory, but the term might suggest that 'combatants' and 'non-combatants' can only refer to roles in a conventional war. My use of the term, however, does not mark some simple contrast between warrior and civilian. Following what seems to me the best interpretation of the just war tradition, I make the distinction between combatant/non-combatant or guilty/innocent hinge on answers to the question who is prosecuting the harms that are believed to legitimate resort to responsive violence, whether in interstate war or violent political insurrection. This interpretation avoids a complete equation between non-combatant (or innocent) and civilian, and rightly so, since there will be many civilians in armed conflicts who are engaged in prosecuting the conflict. A brief, illustrative list would include: scientists developing the weapons or delivery systems, political leaders directing the course of the war or violent human rights abuses related to the war, civilian conspirators who brought about the war for their own political or financial gain, and people working in munitions factories. So understood, the expression 'non-combatant' has some advantages over the word 'innocent', because the latter can misleadingly suggest a rich notion of moral innocence that might count many attacking soldiers as innocent if, for example, they had been coerced to fight. There are further complications of course around this issue, many of which I have addressed elsewhere and will not develop here.

Granted that this is what terrorism is, we need to ask whether it is wrong. My answer is that it is wrong because it violates a basic condition for the conduct of armed hostilities—the principle of discrimination. This is

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a principle of just war theory that condemns deliberate attacks upon the innocent, or as it is usually put, non-combatants. The term 'innocent' here signals the fact that you can only have a warrant for directing violence against people who have done something to deserve it. That something has to be some grievous act, such as military aggression against you, or your neighbours or allies. When that occurs, you are licensed (according to the theory) to direct violence against those who have lost their immunity from lethal attack because of what they have done and are doing. Other members of their nation and population who are not involved in the wrongful attack or in the chain of agency promoting it are immune because they are not engaged in the harming. So, their immunity from attack is no mere conventional matter, it is intrinsic to any permission you might have to use violence at all. This is where the deep wrong of terrorism lies.

Against this, terrorists, whether they be state or sub-state agents often protest that no-one is innocent. They invoke some primitive notion of collective guilt, as Churchill sometimes did about the German nation, and Osama bin Laden tends to do today about Americans. It is a partial refutation, but sufficient here, to point out the absurdity of including the thousands of German and Japanese babies and young children who were deliberately killed in the World War II city bombing in that guilty collectivity. And the same point could be made about the idea that all Americans, including children, can be legitimate targets of al Qaeda violence merely because 'America' has allegedly done some wrong to the world of Islam.

There indeed remain problems in the application of the distinction since there is a grey area in between the clear black and white cases. This means that there is room for argument and discussion about categories like slave labourers forced to work in military-related industries, or compliant civilians whom the enemy settles in occupied territory. That there are problem cases like these does nothing to undermine the distinction, indeed they merely serve to emphasise its importance and the need for sensitive attention to its application. Given the deep wrong of attacking non-combatants, we should, I believe, operate in such areas with something of a bias against counting doubtful cases as combatants.

Some of those who understand terrorism as I do and reject it as immoral on similar grounds, nonetheless argue that it may sometimes in extreme circumstances be justified. Such people usually invoke the idea of 'supreme emergency' popularised by the American political theorist Michael Walzer. They regard terrorism as intrinsically wrong, so that ordinary good outcomes for the perpetrators' cause cannot justify it, but they think that recourse to terrorism may well be justifiable if it is effective in warding off a catastrophe. Walzer uses an argument of this sort to justify the Allied bombing of German cities in the early part of the strategic bombing campaign of World War II, though he thinks the 'supreme emergency' of Nazi victory was no longer available as a justification later in the war. Walzer's position is an instance of what he elsewhere calls 'dirty hands' for he thinks (somewhat in the tradition of Machiavelli) that sometimes politicians may have to do what is palpably morally wrong though it is justified by an overriding 'necessity'.

You can only have a warrant for directing violence against people who have done something to deserve it

I reject the 'supreme emergency' story as applied to real-life terrorism (and to much else) for several reasons. I have argued this more fully elsewhere, so will simply summarise here. First, it is important to note that Walzer condemns terrorism categorically elsewhere in discussing sub-state terrorism, and rejects the idea that necessity or anything else could override the condemnation. This is palpable inconsistency, given that he acknowledges that the Allied bombing was itself terrorism. If supreme emergency can confront states, it can also confront sub-state groups, and only an indefensible pro-state bias can avoid the inconsistency.

Second, whatever the theoretical appeal of supreme emergency exemptions from the prohibition of terrorism, the practical consequences of allowing such exemptions as part of the public discourse on the morality (and possibly legality) of terrorist tactics is certain to be disastrous. The scope for contested interpretation of the opaque notion of 'supreme emergency' and the likely efficacy of terrorism to deal with it is far too great for it to be defensible as a public moral resort. The sanest moral response to terrorism is total rejection.

At this point, it is important to state clearly that terrorism is not the only wrong that political violence can bring about. Wars, revolutions, insurgencies and 'jihads' that have no just cause are themselves profoundly wrong and the combatants who are killed and maimed by the unjust warriors are done a great wrong. The German invaders who killed Polish troops were doing what was morally wrong even though, in this, they were not behaving as terrorists. The Nazi war leaders would have been guilty of a dreadful crime in initiating the immoral violence of their war, even if they had never attacked non-combatants. From this we can see that the issue of whether the initiation of political violence is itself right or wrong, justified or not, is generally irrelevant to the question of whether the violence so used is terrorist. People who use violence in a good cause can use terrorist means (when they violate the principle of discrimination) and those who use it in a

bad cause may, though they often don't, scrupulously respect the principle and hence use no terrorism. The Allies were justified in trying to defeat the Axis powers in World War II but used terrorist means in their city bombings with conventional and nuclear weapons.

Morality and the response to terrorism

Given that terrorism is a genuine evil and that its dimensions have escalated, in some respects, in recent years, we must ask whether the responses to it pose their own moral dangers. Apart from cross-national military efforts, a great deal of the response has been embodied in new legal regimes and practices across the world. There is no space here to review the detailed enactments and proposals across so many jurisdictions, but common problems with the legislative and policy reactions are: first, to see the terrorist threat as greater than it is, and second, to create conditions of life nationally and internationally that themselves threaten significant human rights and civil liberties.

As to the first, the kind of threat sub-state terrorism has so far posed to life and limb is hardly comparable to threats posed by other dangers in the world that excite nothing like the urgency and alarm provoked by the fear of terrorism. Things might be different if sub-state terrorists were able to secure and willing to use weapons of mass destruction, but, as it is, such terrorists pose a real but easily exaggerated risk to the democratic societies that are not already in something like a state of civil war.

Over a period of years the death and suffering caused by sub-state terrorism adds up to a substantial figure, and the destruction of the Twin Towers buildings in Manhattan in 2001 killed about 3,000 people in a very short space of time. Nonetheless, the deaths in that catastrophe were dwarfed by the annual road toll in the United States. Moreover, the estimated 1,000-7,000 yearly deaths world-wide from terrorism (estimates vary considerably partly because of different definitions of terrorism) pale into insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die every day from hunger, and the millions who die annually from diseases like influenza, HIV-AIDS, diarrhoea, and tuberculosis. Certainly the staggering sums spent on 'the war against terror' could save many more lives if only a substantial proportion was diverted to the prevention of serious disease and alleviation of hunger.

The conclusion might be that people should be less anxious and afraid about terrorism, than they are. This is an important conclusion, not only because of its potential effects upon the problems mentioned above, but also because the fear and anxiety provoked by terrorism is leading to the diminution of very important rights and conditions of living, at least in the comfortable nations of the world. This is the second problem mentioned above. It is worth emphasising that these rights are hard-won protections from the potential (and often actual) abuse of state power. Civil liberties are not fancy frills on living, but basic protections from the very real threat of state oppression. They are, or should be, part of what we mean by 'security' so threats to them are threats to our security. To this extent, the standard contrast of security with liberty can be profoundly misleading. Our right to life is one of our basic rights, but so is our right to protection from the excesses of state power. Democracy itself is a great advance on other forms of government, but the bare rule of the majority is insufficient to protect people from oppression. We also need enshrined protections, such as the right to counsel when arrested, right to a speedy and fair hearing and to confront our accusers and hear all the evidence against us, right to medical aid, rights not to be tortured or denied medical help, and so on. This list is only a list of very basic rights, but all are under threat in one way or another in counter-terrorism reactions.

Moreover, the reduction of these rights in the advanced democracies also signals a setback to the spread of these rights elsewhere in the world. Nations with abysmal human rights records have been quick to join up to the war on terror and use its cover to suppress minority groups with legitimate grievances, even where they have had little or no recourse to terrorism. China's campaign against its nationalist Uirghurs is just one example of this depressing trend, a trend that is made to appear more respectable by confusions over the meaning of 'terrorism'.

The possibility of dramatic injustice in responses to terrorism in the established democracies is no mere speculation. In Britain police recently killed a defenceless and innocent Brazilian on unfounded suspicion of terrorist connections, and in the 1970s, there were gross miscarriages of justice in the trials of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, and the Maguire Seven. These trials involved fraudulent convictions of innocent people in panic-reactions to IRA terrorist outrages. In the Birmingham Six case, 21 people were killed in a Provisional IRA bomb attack on a Birmingham pub in 1974. The six Irishmen arrested were tortured by police and made confessions which they later unsuccessfully renounced. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. After several appeals were dismissed, their third appeal was finally upheld in 1991 with the finding of police fabrication, suppression of evidence and unsafe confessions. The success of the appeal was partly due to a public

The sanest moral response to terrorism is total rejection

campaign run by concerned civil libertarians, and was certainly not aided by the authorities either political or judicial. The victims were released after serving 16 years in prison for crimes they did not commit. None of the police involved were ever prosecuted! If these injustices can happen in a country with a long constitutional tradition and strong legal traditions, imagine what is likely in the authoritarian regimes that are joining up to the war against terror.

Another link with global conceptions of justice that arises from the counter-terrorism project is the practice of 'extraordinary rendition', whereby the leaders of established democracies send prisoners or detained suspects for interrogation in allied states where democracy is unknown or fragile and where torture is common practice. Exporting people for torture in this way, or establishing torture centres of your own in foreign parts, is now clearly happening and indeed appears to be a common practice with authorities in the United States. One shocking case was the arrest of the Syrian-born Canadian citizen Maher Arar at a stopover at Kennedy airport in New York in September 2002. He was held in US detention for two weeks then sent to Syria where he was, by his own account, severely tortured for months on end until his release without charge 13 months later, no links with terrorism having been discovered. He is now suing the US government who are trying to get the case dismissed on the grounds of 'state secrets'.

Moreover, even were the threat of sub-state terrorism much greater than it is, the state authorities would need to show that the danger can really be countered by the restriction of liberty. There is much talk these days about the need for a new 'balance' between liberty and security. I have already indicated one thing that is wrong with this—namely, that our liberty is part of our security. But another problem is that little effort is ever made by state authorities to show that the proposed changes to the balance will actually make us safer from terrorist attack. Often, they simply assume that drastic changes are needed for new threats, but new threats can often be managed by old techniques or minor adjustments, and terrorism is not a new phenomenon at all.

A major problem in dealing with governmental overreactions is that the damage caused seldom impacts directly in the short term upon the bulk of the population. Most people do not regard themselves as likely candidates for detention without charge or trial, deportation on mere suspicion, or subjection to extraordinary interrogation measures. But these or other new processes may well be directed at those deemed 'extremists' with no possibility of rebutting the label, or at strong critics of governmental policy in the war against terror, or groups with the relevant 'profile' like Muslims. We should not want to live in a community where poorly justified state powers endanger our fellow citizens (and visitors) in these ways. Moreover, the extension of arbitrary state power may well be hard to restrict. Our comfort as unlikely victims may be short lived. Martin Niemoller's famous comment on public inertia in Germany in the face of Nazi power is worth recalling:

Liberty is part of our security

> *When the Nazis arrested the Communists,*
> *I said nothing; after all, I was not a Communist.*
> *When they locked up the Social Democrats,*
> *I said nothing; after all, I was not a Social Democrat.*
> *When they arrested the trade unionists,*
> *I said nothing; after all, I was not a trade unionist.*
> *When they arrested the Jews, I said nothing; after all, I was not a Jew.*
> *When they arrested me, there was no longer anyone who could protest.*

A full version of this article will be published in Professor Coady's forthcoming book Morality and Political Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.*

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